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Abstract 
 
 
Zambia was a middle-income country when it achieved independence from Great Britain in 
1964. After decades of international aid Zambia has become a low-income country, and its 
per capita GDP is only now returning to the levels it had reached over forty years ago. While 
aid is far from the only variable at work in Zambia’s development, its impact has been 
questionable. This paper examines the issue of aid effectiveness in Zambia, especially in 
terms of how the incentive structure faced by donors may lead to decreased accountability and 
inadequate concern for long-term outcomes, rendering aid less beneficial. The paper 
concludes by proposing a revised approach to the provision and use of international aid in 
Zambia, as well as in other aid-dependent countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The vision of aid that dominated the international development discourse5 in the early 
years of large-scale development operations, was that external financing functioned as a vital 
source of ancillary revenue for recipient countries; it helped to fill financing gaps and boosted 
capital investment, which in turn led to more rapid growth in countries with limited domestic 
savings and little or no access to international private capital markets. Evidence accumulated 
over decades of experience with international development assistance suggests that this 
picture is not entirely inaccurate, and aid advocates (Sachs, Stiglitz, Stern, Collier and others) 
point to the positive contribution of aid to development in countries such as Botswana, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Tanzania and Mozambique (Radelet, 2006).  
 
However, in many other countries, e.g. Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo6, 
Niger, Mali, Central African Republic, Burundi and Malawi, to name a few in Africa, and in 
Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, in other regions, aid has proven 
largely ineffective in securing lasting change. Moreover, as critics of international aid 
(Friedman, Bauer, Easterly and others) have pointed out, in some cases aid has apparently 
harmed recipient economies by enlarging government bureaucracies and enriching elites 
while doing little to spur growth or reduce poverty (ibid.). Bad governance, high levels of 
political and petty corruption, general unaccountability on the part of donors and recipients, 
poor management of aid mechanisms, and the inability to establish private-sector stability in 
recipient countries are all identified as contributing factors in the failure of development 
efforts (Easterly, 2003, 2006).  
 
The fundamental question of the current development debate is how to make aid more 
effective7 in achieving its economic and human-development objectives, and many analysts 
have suggested that the best way to do this is by focusing on demonstrable, preferably 
quantifiable results in order to gauge the cost-effectiveness of different aid strategies. A 
number of theoretical and empirical studies have raised questions about the ultimate impact of 
international aid, largely by focusing on the relationship between aid and growth. However, 
these studies have tended to yield ambiguous or conflicting results.  
 
The most influential study to highlight the relationship between aid effectiveness and 
the domestic policy environment of recipient countries is by Burnside and Dollar (2000). The 
authors find that aid is effective in enhancing growth only in the presence of sound 
macroeconomic policies, namely well-controlled inflation, the maintenance of a structural 
budget balance or surplus, and a position of trade openness; this implies that selectively 
allocating aid in favor of countries with sound policies would be most effective in supporting 
growth. Burnside and Dollar’s findings opened a new debate on the structure of aid financing 
and were codified in the official guidelines used by the World Bank and a number of donor 
countries. Nevertheless, Burnside and Dollar's findings have been repeatedly challenged by 
subsequent research (see Hadjimichael et al., 1995; Durbarry et al., 1998; Hansen and Tarp, 
                                                           
5
 This idea was developed during and after WWII; it informed the founding of the Bretton-Woods institutions, of 
which the World Bank and IMF are a part as pointed out by Easterly (2009), and still prevails, though often in 
modified form, throughout much of the current international development discourse. 
6
 From 1950 to 2001 Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo experienced zero and negative rates of per 
capita growth, respectively, despite the financial support they received (Easterly, 2006). 
7 According to OECD-DAC aid is effective when it is delivered through efficient and reliable institutions, when 
it is allocated predictably and is country-owned, and when donor operations are successfully harmonized. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.40
3 
 
2000, 2001; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Easterly et al., 2003; Jensen and Paldam, 2003; and 
Roodman, 2007). 
 
With the progressive shift of the debate on aid effectiveness from a myopic focus on 
growth to increasingly inclusive conceptions of poverty reduction, several studies have 
concentrated on evaluating aid effectiveness in reducing poverty by analyzing not only its 
impact on overall growth but on basic human development indicators such as infant mortality, 
primary school enrolment rates, and life expectancy (Mosley et al., 1987; Boone, 1996). 
Although many recent analyses have relied on longitudinal data, Carter (2010) demonstrates 
that that existing research into the relationship between international aid and taxation in 
recipient countries has been compromised by conceptual and econometric deficiencies 
between cases, concluding that “detailed case studies […] may prove more illuminating than 
cross-country empirics”. Therefore, this study will focus on aid and development in Zambia, 
which provides a particularly revealing example of the dynamic interaction between aid and a 
wide variety of other domestic and international factors.  
 
Zambia is both aid-dependent8 and resource-rich, and has experienced a development 
trajectory similar to that of several other resource-rich SSA countries. In 1965, just after 
achieving its independence, Zambia’s per capita GDP was almost three times that of South 
Korea. By 1975, however, their per capita GDP was roughly equal, and by 2001 South 
Korea’s per capita GDP exceeded Zambia’s by more than twenty times over (McPherson 
2004.1). During the long period of economic stagnation that began in the 1970s, and which 
was due in large part to a highly inefficient degree of state control over the economy, the 
Zambian government started to become increasingly dependent on international aid flows. 
After several decades of recurrent grant-based and concessional lending operations, and 
despite a modestly accelerating growth rate in the past decade, Zambia lost its status as a 
middle-income country and remains a low-income country today. Like many resource-rich 
developing countries, Zambia is characterized by a high level of poverty (in 2006, 59 percent 
of the population was below the national poverty line according to the Zambian government’s 
Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, and the national poverty rate has remained at a steady 
60 percent based on preliminary data for 2010); it also exhibits a radically unequal income 
distribution (the Gini coefficient is currently 0.53) and has an undiversified economy that 
remains overwhelmingly dependent on primary commodity exports, in this case copper and 
cobalt. The ultimate contribution of aid to development in Zambia is therefore questionable. 
 
In the case of low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and especially those 
already evincing poor governance indicators, it appears that sustained aid dependence has had 
negative impacts on domestic political and administrative accountability and on the overall 
quality of governance (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). According to Nobel Laureate Elinor 
Ostrom (2010) aid often fails to achieve its intended results because of perverse incentives 
faced by the recipient government, incentives which are caused by a number of factors 
common to the operations of most donors. These include aid agencies’ preference for easily 
identifiable short-term results over less obvious but potentially more important long-term 
                                                           
8
 McPherson (2004.2) defines nine criteria for identifying aid-dependent countries. According to this analysis aid 
dependency is a function of: (i) the duration of major aid programs, (ii) the size of aid flows relative to domestic 
resources mobilized for public capital formation, (iii) the share of locally generated resources used for external 
debt service, (iv) the import coverage provided by aid flows, (v) the value of aid flows relative to the current-
account balance , (vi) the size of any changes in the external debt stock due to the country’s own financing 
efforts, (vii) the proportion of public health, education and infrastructure budgets that are aid-financed, (viii) the 
expected results of aid and penalties (if any) for underachievement, and (ix) the presence or absence of a 
program to reduce aid flows over time. 
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objectives, as well as their bureaucratic desire to spend the entirety of their allocated budgets 
within the fiscal year, and the fact that employees in aid agencies typically do not remain in 
the same assignments over the long term, making it difficult to hold them accountable for 
poor results and reinforcing their short-term bias. Aid dependence also tends to undermine or 
limit the scope for domestic government accountability, which may have a negative impact on 
economic and social development outcomes through one or more of several recognized 
channels: 
 
(1) By substituting international transfers for domestic tax revenue aid dependence creates 
incentives for governments to be accountable to donors rather than to their own citizens 
(Bräutigam, 2000). When governments respond to these incentives and donors exercise a high 
degree of control over policy and spending decisions, domestic institutions such as national 
legislatures and public oversight agencies are likely to be marginalized (Eberlei and Henn, 
2003; Langdon and Draman, 2005), consequently domestic ownership of donor-sponsored 
reform initiatives may be undermined and the scope for domestic accountability and the 
importance of democratic decision-making may be diminished (Whitfield and Fraser, 2008);  
 
(2) Similarly, aid may slow the emergence of a more legitimate, sustainable, tax-based social 
contract between citizens/voters/taxpayers and the state (OECD, 2008c).9 Aid may even 
undermine the emergence of effective tax systems in recipient countries, since governments in 
these countries have less incentive to collect taxes when large-scale aid flows are available,10 
and governments may choose not to collect certain taxes if their accountability to aid agencies 
is less rigorous than their accountability to domestic taxpayers; 
 
(3) A lack of transparency in aid mechanisms may further limit the scope for domestic 
accountability in the budgetary and public-policy processes. When legislatures, auditing and 
other oversight institutions, and civil society organizations cannot control the amount of aid 
received or influence how it is spent, or even monitor its impact, they will not be able to hold 
the relevant agencies accountable for their performance. In many developing countries some 
portion of international aid is channeled outside the formal budget process, and this 
considerably limits the scope for domestic accountability (CABRI/SPA, 2008). 
 
Aid, of course, is not the only factor at work in a country’s development. Even at their 
height, aid flows to Zambia were dwarfed by the economic size and trade-balance impact of 
the mining industry, and the damaging effects of primary-commodity export dependence have 
been repeatedly observed even in countries with strong government institutions, direct access 
to world markets and a high degree of external stability. Zambia, by contrast, is a landlocked 
country surrounded by several states with a history of violent conflict, extreme economic 
volatility, and in some cases both. Structural economic factors (the presence of high-value 
resources, the absence of a direct link to world markets) and exogenous political and 
economic uncertainty have undoubtedly exerted a strongly negative influence on Zambian 
development. These conditions, however, are largely beyond the ability of the government 
and its cooperating partners to influence; aid remains the primary area in which the domestic 
administration and the international community can promote development objectives. 
                                                           
9
  Moyo (2009) presents the case that aid may actually reduce the accountability of political leaders in the 
African continent.  
10
 This is one effect that seems especially likely in the case of Zambia, since the government’s preference for aid 
is reinforced when the most obvious source of tax-revenue alternatives come from large international companies, 
such as those operating in the Zambian mining sector, which due to their organizational resources and political-
economic importance are already capable of influencing government policy in their favor. 
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The goal of this analysis is to use Zambia as a case study by drawing lessons from 
various specific project evaluations. Political economy issues and the incentives faced by both 
the donor community and the government are crucially important in explaining the poor 
results generated by many aid-financed projects. The conclusions of this analysis are 
particularly concerned with the relative limited ability of international aid to promote 
governance reform, as well as the ways in which the incentive structure of some donors may 
lead to decreased government accountability and even promote complacency on the part of 
Zambian civil society regarding the government’s behavior, and how the use of aid flows may 
distort the incentives of public officials in ways that potentially damage growth and 
perpetuate poverty.  
 
This paper is divided as followed: the second section, which follows this introduction, 
presents an assessment of long-term trends in aid flows in Zambia and highlights recent 
developments therein. The third section presents an analysis of the impact of certain specific 
donor-financed projects on key social indicators. The fourth section discusses why some 
projects have failed to achieve their objectives, with particular attention paid to political-
economy effects. The final section presents the conclusions of the analysis and proposes a set 
of policy recommendations, which while specific to the Zambian context, may offer insight 
into the manifold challenges of ensuring better aid effectiveness in countries throughout Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
 
II. Aid in Zambia and its limited impact on economic and social 
development 
 
Zambia started to receive significant aid flows in the mid-1960s. For most of the first 
decade of Zambia’s independence, aid was provided mainly in the form of technical 
assistance and was used to support government-initiated projects. However, since the mid-
1970s the government’s budget has become increasingly dependent on external financing, and 
Zambia is now one of the most aid-dependent countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Figure 
1 shows net official development assistance (ODA) per capita in Zambia and in SSA as a 
whole. 
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Figure 1: Net ODA per capita: Zambia and SSA, 1960-2009, in current US$. 
 
 
 
Source: OECD database. 
 
ODA per capita in Zambia clearly trends upward through 1995, when it hit a peak of 
US$225.95, nearly seven times the SSA average. Since 1995 Zambian ODA per capita has 
fallen to an annual average of about US$7911, which is still more than twice the SSA average 
of US$34. However, the gap between Zambian ODA per capita and that of the region as a 
whole seems to be diminishing over time (Carlsson et al., 2000). Although the growth of the 
Zambian economy has accelerated in recent years, the leveling-off of per-capita aid flows 
(which despite the spike in 1995 have remained roughly constant since 1991) did not reflect 
an increase in private-sector productivity or domestic revenue mobilization, but was rather the 
result of a general decline in ODA to the Africa region from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s , 
due in part to rising donor concern about the credibility of governments in recipient countries 
with regard to good governance and anticorruption efforts, and also as a consequence of 
increasing pressure on donors’ national budgets (especially in the context of the Maastricht 
criteria). Following the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 
donor commitments to scale up aid translated into increasing ODA flows, which reached a 
second peak of about US$121 per capita in Zambia and US$50 in SSA in 2006. Meanwhile, 
the ratio of net ODA flows to gross national income (GNI) in Zambia has oscillated since the 
1980s, reaching a peak in 1995 of about 63%, more than  10 times the average for the SSA 
region (at 6%). 
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Figure 2: Net ODA to Zambia and SSA, 1960-2009, as % of recipient GNI. 
 
 
Source: OECD database. 
 
In Zambia, the increase in ODA from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s and from the 
early 1990s to the mid-1990s, both in per capita terms and as a percentage of GNI, was 
significant, and much higher than in SSA as a whole. This increase in aid flows was, in the 
first case, the consequence of a sharp decline in copper prices (following a global copper-
price spike prompted by the materiel demands of the Vietnam War) and a subsequent increase 
in oil prices (spurred by the OPEC crisis of the 1970s). These were short-term shocks, but 
they pushed the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) to increase foreign borrowing 
to finance its domestic expenditures (Nokkala, 2001). This in turn resulted in a significant rise 
in foreign debt. With debt-service obligations growing to unmanageable levels, Zambia began 
accessing new options for debt relief (see Table 1, below), including bilateral initiatives and, 
more recently, multilateral initiatives offered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank and the African Development Bank, especially through the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) program and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). Zambia’s 
participation in these programs partially explains the recent leveling-off of aid flows, since 
from the donor perspective debt relief and new aid transfers are essentially the same thing. 
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Table 1: Debt service payments and external aid flows, Zambia, 1992-1999, in millions of 
US$. 
 
 
 
Source: Nokkala (2001) based on IMF(200b). 
 
 
Figure 3: Bilateral and Multilateral ODA, Zambia, 1960-2009, million US$. 
 
 
Source: OECD database. 
 
 
Despite many years of large-scale aid, which has exhibited an increasing overall trend 
in the last decade, GDP per capita growth has not increased accordingly12 (see Figure 4). The 
situation has even deteriorated to such an extent that, by 1985, the World Bank re-classified 
Zambia from a low-middle income country to a low-income and by the early 1990 Zambia 
                                                           
12
 In the absence of counterfactual, it can also be argued that the situation would have been worse without aid. 
Being worse or not without aid, the objectives set in most projects have not been met. 
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was included on the list of least developed countries by the United Nations Assembly. Zambia 
experienced one of the worst economic declines in SSA (Carlsson, 2000).  
 
Even though in recent years (starting 1999) Zambia experienced strong economic 
growth with an average annual real GDP rate of more than 5 percent, growth has not been 
accompanied by significant poverty reduction. Growth pattern in Zambia does not appear to 
have been pro-poor. The overall levels of poverty remain high, at 59 percent according to the 
2006 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey LCMS13. According to preliminary estimates 
from the 2010 LCMS, overall poverty levels have remained unchanged, at about 60 percent.  
 
Nevertheless, there have been some improvements in social indicators, i.e. education 
and health—such as increases in the primary and secondary school enrolments14, marginal 
improvements in youth literacy rate, reductions in the under-five and maternal mortality rates 
(see Table 2). The aid by sector (Table in Annex 1), confirms that over the period 1995-2009 
the flows were mainly directed to social sectors, especially health sector (but also to the action 
related to debt relief).  
 
However, the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) has not much 
improved (see Table 3). Zambia is ranked 150 in the HDI out of 169 countries worldwide in 
2010, and 26 out of 43 in SSA region.  
 
Figure 4: Aid per capita and GDP per capita, Zambia, 1960-2009, current US$ 
 
Source: World Development Indicators for GDP per capita and OECD database for aid data. 
 
 
Table 2: Selected Social Sector Results 
Latest single year 
1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 
Primary school enrollment (% net) 68.2 92.3 95.2 
Secondary school enrollment (% gross) 25.6 33.5 45.6 
Youth literacy rate (% of people ages 15-24) 69.5 69.1 74.8 
                                                           
13
 While in urban areas poverty rate was 27 percent in 2006, in rural areas the rate is much higher, about 77 
percent in 2006.  
14
 Challenges remain, such as limited access to education in rural areas, overcrowded classrooms, or the low quality of basic 
education. 
0,00
200,00
400,00
600,00
800,00
1000,00
1200,00
1400,00
0
50
100
150
200
250
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Aid per capita GDP per capita
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.40
10 
 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 41.7 42.8 45.4 
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 165.7 155.3 141.3 
Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births) 600.0 560.0 470.0 
Prevalence of HIV (% of population ages 15-49) 15.4 15.0 15.2 
Headcount Poverty ratio (% of population) 66.8 58.4 59.3 
   Source: World Bank World Development Indicators and Central Statistics Office (CSO). 
 
 
Table 3: Human Development Indicator, Zambia and SSA 
 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Zambia 0.382  
 
0.410 0.423 0.371 0.345 0.360 0.363 0.370 0.379 0.387 0.395 
SSA 0.293 0.306 0.354 0.358 0.315 0.366 0.372 0.377 0.379 0.384 0.389 
   Source: Human Development Indicators Trends, UNDP. 
 
 
According to McPherson “the rationale for designing a strategy that sustains growth 
and development is “impossible while Zambia remains as dependent on foreign resources as it 
has been since the early 1970s”. His conclusions were the following: (1) Zambia regressed 
despite massive aid, (2) poverty increased despite aid, (3) aid did not stimulate restructuring 
of the economy, (4) a large part of its aid was simply wasted15.  
 
This paper attempts to explain the disappointing results of aid in Zambia and assess 
potential solutions for improving aid effectiveness. 
 
 
III. Assessment of selected aid-financed projects 
 
As in most SSA countries, aid to Zambia has been delivered through a variety of 
instruments. Donor coordination has also been strengthened in the last decade, impacting the 
relative effectiveness of different instruments. Budget support (through both general and 
sector-wide approaches) assumed a major role in the 1990s and 2000s, although project-based 
aid continues to be the most important instrument in terms of the total amount of financing.  
 
Direct budget support was introduced in Zambia in the early 1990s. In 1993, sector-
wide approaches (SWAps) for the health sector were developed16 (Chansa, 2008; Chansa et 
al., 2008). SWAps were then expanded to other sectors in the Agricultural Sector Investment 
Program (ASIP) in 1996, the Road Sector Investment Program (ROADSIP) in 1998, and to 
the Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Program (BESSIP) in 1999. 
 
The World Bank’s Logical Framework for Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) 
defines the purpose of aid as the reduction of poverty and the realization of the MDGs 
                                                           
15
 Recent audits of the public health and road construction sectors in Zambia support this conclusion. 
16
 The National Health Strategic Plan 2001-2005 was designed to gradually transform the provision of funds to 
district “baskets” into a general health-sector basket (Ministry of Health, 2000, 2005). Before this plan, ODA 
funding modalities in the sector consisted of a mix of project-based and basket funding, as well as sector-wide 
and general budget support. 
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through improving the effectiveness of the national budget, which is recognized as GRZ’s key 
policy instrument for poverty reduction. The PRBS document stresses the central role of the 
current Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) as the overarching strategy and action plan 
for poverty reduction.  Budget support represents approximately 30 percent of total aid in 
Zambia, according to data from 2008 and 2009, while project support accounts for the 
remaining 70 percent. 
 
A donor harmonization process began to take shape in 2002.17 In 2003, the GRZ and 
its cooperating partners (CPs) signed the Harmonization in Practice (HIP) Memorandum of 
Understanding. This progressively developed into the Wider Harmonization in Practice 
(WHIP) initiative. In October 2005, a Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) was 
agreed upon by the GRZ and its CPs, and in May 2007 the JASZ 2007-2010 was signed.18 
The JASZ includes a medium-term framework developed by the CPs to manage their 
cooperation with the GRZ in accordance with the FNDP. The JASZ contains principles, 
commitments and proposed actions to be undertaken by the CPs across the five pillars of the 
Paris Declaration (2005), as well as advancing the Division of Labour exercise which was 
established as part of the HIP and WHIP processes. However, the JASZ contains no specific 
targets, nor does it define indicators against which its progress could be measured. A work 
plan was developed in late 2007, and some elements of this plan have since been 
implemented, but there have been no subsequent work plans and no systematic process is in 
place to follow up on the commitments made and actions agreed upon.  
 
An evaluation of recent donor operations in Zambia across various programmatic 
sectors such as education, health, public sector reform, private sector development and 
general budget support19 reveals two principal conclusions: 
 
(1) Most aid-funded projects have been relatively or very successful in terms of their 
immediate outputs: schools are built, roads are rehabilitated, access to social services is 
improved, relevant administrative and legislation reforms are adopted and so on. 
 
(2) But results have been much more limited regarding the quality of service delivery and the 
achievement of broader development objectives such as improving educational attainment, 
decreasing transport costs, raising the competitiveness of Zambian companies, and reducing 
rural poverty (which are, however, the rationale of aid-financed projects). 
 
The most likely explanations for these mixed results can be linked to governance and 
political economy issues presented in the following section.  
 
 
                                                           
17
 Aid fragmentation has been identified as harmful to recipient ownership. 
18
 The signatories to the JASZ include twelve bilateral donors, the European Commission, the United Nations, 
the World Bank and the African Development Bank. Although the GRZ is not a signatory to the JASZ or to the 
work plan, government actions are essential for the success of the JASZ. 
19
 An overview of the major results of these projects is presented in Annex 2. Due to the relatively small number 
of such studies, some projects may be outliers and not representative of donor projects overall. This possibility 
is, however, limited by the broad sectoral coverage of the sample and the evidence of similar patterns emerging 
in multiple sectors.  
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IV. Why has aid not been more effective in Zambia? The 
importance of governance, political economy and incentive 
structures 
 
In his study on aid dependency in Zambia, McPherson (2004.2) explained that “as 
foreign aid is currently being administered, most if not all aid agencies (and their NGO 
satellites) have lost sight of the reasons for providing economic assistance. Moreover, the 
Zambian government has been so ‘hooked’ on foreign aid that the pressure to ensure that aid 
continues flowing has distorted the government’s whole approach to economic management”. 
Further evidence supports these conclusions. In Zambia the impact of aid has been lower than 
expected in large part because donors are usually unable to address the aid-related incentive 
structure faced by local and national authorities. In addition, donors may present 
overambitious and unrealistic development plans, and often directly damage their prospects 
for success by insisting on needlessly complex or infeasible strategies.  
 
1. Recipients’ low quality of governance and inadequate oversight of public 
spending reduce the impact of donor-funded programs 
 
Even if a recipient country’s government is strongly invested in promoting economic 
growth and welfare of its population, its policymakers, as a rule, are also interested in staying 
in power. Sometimes political elites may deliberately sabotage their country’s economic 
development if they fear that it would mobilize political opposition (Acemoglu et al., 2002). 
And individual bureaucrats often try to increase their budgets in the hopes of enhancing their 
administrative positions (Niskanen, 1971), a phenomenon which frequently affects donor 
agents as well. At the same time, interest groups within the recipient country’s political 
system, private sector and civil society lobby for their own rights and privileges, which may 
be inconsistent with broader public interest and the achievement of the government’s stated 
development goals.20 In extreme cases recipient governments may not even be interested in 
building effective economic and social institutions to improve living standards and reduce 
poverty, and bad institutions may be kept in place not for the benefit of the society as a whole, 
but for the benefit of the ruling elite.  
 
To overcome this conflict of interest between recipients and donors one commonly 
used solution has been to tie aid to certain conditions. For example, recipients may be 
required to take concrete steps toward establishing governance systems that enhance their 
administrative and budgetary efficiency, promote private-sector growth, expand public service 
provision, or directly contribute to reducing poverty. However, conditionality does not always 
function as intended, either because the conditions have been tied to the wrong policy reforms 
or because they have not been adequately enforced, with future aid continuing to be disbursed 
regardless of whether the relevant conditions have been fulfilled (Svensson, 2003).  
 
                                                           
20
 A problem often faced by SSA countries is the absence of accountability and effective monitoring mechanisms 
within the public administration. This enables political leaders and powerful bureaucrats to use aid inflows to 
enrich themselves and reduces their incentives to implement democratic reforms and build new institutions. 
Consequently, the increase in government revenues provided by aid inflows may not lead to an increase in the 
provision of public goods, and in some cases may reduce it (Svensson, 2000). Several examples of aid resources 
being captured by politicians and local officials are provided by Reinikka and Svensson (2003) in a survey of 
SSA countries.  
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Zambia has long demonstrated a high degree of inefficiency in public spending. In 
2003, the Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review (World Bank 
2003) detailed numerous problems in this area. In particular, the Constitution was deemed to 
grant an excessive amount of discretion to the Ministry of Finance and National Planning 
(MoFNP), which could be misused in the absence of proper parliamentary oversight. In terms 
of budget preparation, the study found that budgets approved by Parliament were structurally 
overcommitted (i.e. their spending commitments routinely exceeded their available revenue), 
and disposition of actual expenditures at the end of the year significantly differed from 
original budget estimates.21 
 
In 2010, following a well-publicized corruption scandal in the health sector, an 
auditing process was put in place to assess the magnitude of corruption and establish better 
control mechanisms. The impact of these reforms is not yet apparent. Though it may be too 
early to assess, there were a number of weaknesses in the reform program itself. Among the 
remedial measures undertaken by the government, integrity22 and audit committees23 were 
created. However, these may be subject to an inherent conflict of interest: integrity 
committees, for instance, are solely composed of institutional insiders. This is one method by 
which audit functions and oversight institutions may be weakened, but there are many others. 
For instance, a broader program of public sector reforms restructured all directorates and 
elevated their functional heads to the Director level, but the heads of accounting and auditing 
remained at the Assistant Director level. As a result, these units cannot exercise adequate 
oversight of their institutions due to their low rank in the public administration hierarchy. 
Moreover, the government’s failure to provide adequate resources for the effective operation 
of either the Judicature or the Anti-Corruption Commission has, over the years, led to delays 
in the conclusion of some cases, especially those involving high-ranking individuals. 
According to Mwangala (2010), “political interference is evidenced by the selective 
application of convictions and discontinuation of some cases that legally ought to be 
prosecuted following the directives of the Director of Public Prosecution”. Furthermore, even 
in those instances where administrative abuses have been found, recommendations made by 
the Public Accounts Committee on corrective measures have in most cases not been 
implemented due to lack of political will. 
 
In her review of oversight institutions in Zambia,24 Mwangala revealed that their 
failure to effectively achieve their mandates is primarily due to the politicization of the 
Zambian civil service. This, in turn, is the result of changes in the conditions of service for 
                                                           
21
 In order to address these weaknesses the World Bank recommended: (i) abolishing cash rationing, (ii) 
enforcing expenditure controls, (iii) properly recording spending commitments, especially for capital projects, 
(iv) systematically updating payroll lists to control the wage bill, and (v) reforming procurement practices and 
regulations to improve value-for-money in public expenditures (World Bank 2003). 
22
 The integrity committees’ mandate, inter alia, is to lead the fight against corruption, promote the development 
and internalization of the Code of Ethics, facilitate the development and implementation of service charters, and 
to consider and redress all complaints relating to ethical issues and unsatisfactory service delivery.   
23
 These were set up in 2007 and are present in all Ministries, Provinces and Other Spending Agencies (MPSAs).  
Their mandate is to receive reports from Internal Auditors, evaluate and review audit policy, and evaluate 
management procedures.  
24
 In Zambia, oversight functions at two stages.  The first stage, internal oversight, relates to the checks and 
balances that focus on the prevention of abuses within the Ministries, Provinces and other Spending Agencies 
(MPSAs).  These checks and balances are implemented by different institutions, the mandates of which focus on 
different aspects of the misuse-prevention chain. The second stage, external oversight, relates to the checks and 
balances that are a result of the failures of the prevention chain, and this takes place outside the MPSAs.  
External oversight consists of two parts: the audit and investigation chain, the focus of which is on establishing 
wrongdoing, and the prosecution chain, which is responsible for effecting punitive and remedial measures. 
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Permanent Secretaries, which began in 2003 with a switch to three-year, performance-based 
contracts. This initiative, though meant to harmonize the conditions of service for career civil 
servants with those for outside employees and to improve efficiency by tying the renewal of 
the contracts to performance, has instead resulted in a lack of job security. Moreover, the 
renewal of employment contracts has not typically been performance-based, and the 
termination of contracts has more often been due to political interference. Career civil 
servants are therefore compelled to cultivate the support of senior public officials25 even at the 
expense of program quality (ibid.).26 Consequently, adherence to financial regulations in these 
institutions has weakened, and a culture of misuse and patronage been allowed to develop. 
Whereas oversight institutions theoretically have the power to discharge public servants for 
violating regulations, most institutions do not do so.   
 
There has also been a three-decade-long debate on whether or not to earmark funds for 
specific sectors (and give autonomy to the institution in charge of managing earmarked funds) 
as a possible means to reduce corruption.27 Proponents of earmarked funds argue that this 
system reduces bureaucratic inefficiency, which promotes the swift completion of projects 
and contributes to reducing costs and increasing the stability of sector funding. The example 
of the roads sector is useful, since that sector has essentially piloted a version of this system, 
advocated by donors, with staff receiving increased autonomy from public service rules and 
procedures when using earmarked funds. 
 
At the end of the 1990s, when the fight against corruption started to become a priority 
in the roads sector and donors strived to ensure adequate financing for road maintenance, 
there was a push to establish second-generation road funds and to revise the institutional setup 
of roads-sector agencies. These agencies were placed under the authority of the board of the 
National Road Funds Authority (NFRA) in which major road users (such as trucking 
companies) were represented in order to strengthen accountability and limit political 
interference. Moreover, NFRA staff members were exempted from the regular condition of 
civil service in order to increase their motivation and reduce political interference and 
corruption. As Heggie (1999) noted: “it is the composition of these boards which make them 
work,” adding, “the procedure in Zambia, where the board [of NRFA] elects is own 
chairperson, is unusual, although it has worked well”. Zambia adopted this system in the 
1990s and expanded it in the early 2000s with the creation of the Road Development 
Authority (RDA) and the Road Transportation Safety Authority (RTSA).  
 
However, it now appears that these reforms have not necessarily worked as expected. 
The road agency boards, and in particular that of RDA, do not seem to have been able to 
avoid political interference in project selection or supervision as described in road audits 
commissioned by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG). And one of the most important 
shortcomings of the new institutional arrangements seems to have been the decreased 
accountability of civil servants working in this sector. And it is not apparent whether any of 
its putative advantages, such as increased cost-effectiveness, have actually materialized. 
 
                                                           
25
 Some officers holding management positions in the Public Service are no longer professional civil servants 
and are more likely to be swayed by outside interests, for instance politicians whose objectives are not 
necessarily consistent with adherence to regulations (Mwangala 2010).   
26
 This is in contrast to policies of the First Republic era, during which the Permanent Secretaries had a longer 
tenure in office as they worked under permanent and pensionable conditions of service.  
27
 For references on this debate see McCleary (1989). 
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2. Donors’ overly ambitious or unrealistic plans to reduce poverty  
 
Whether enshrined in the MDGs or in donors’ individual country assistance strategies, 
optimistic targets are usually set in order to highlight the potentially rapid and dramatic 
impact of donor-funded development projects. However, some frequently-recurring objectives 
have proven particularly difficult to realize. Reducing poverty in rural areas, for instance is 
often a major objective of donors, but in practice a sustained rise in rural incomes has more 
often been achieved through the gradual migration of the rural poor to urban areas rather than 
through interventions designed to improve the incomes and living conditions of the rural 
population. Changing economic policies and implementing structural reforms to generate pro-
poor growth is easier said than done, and even with the right policies in place and effective 
reforms implemented, poverty reduction is a long process that not only relies in a high rate of 
economic growth (which may be largely dependent on exogenous factors) but is also backed 
by a firm, ongoing commitment by the government to maintain these policies over time, often 
against the pressures of influential special interests. This does not imply that reducing poverty 
rates from 60 to 30 percent, as targeted in the MDGs, is not feasible; but it cannot be achieved 
by donor involvement alone, and requires a government that is committed to economic 
growth and capable of implementing a long-term reform program backed by a positive 
economic climate and the absence of severe exogenous shocks. All of these are circumstances 
which by their nature cannot be assured. As a result some donor-financed programs may be 
based more on the assumption of these conditions rather than their reality. 
 
In specific program areas, donors may make specific assumptions that inform program 
goals but are ultimately unrealistic.  It has not escaped the notice of the donor community that 
rural poverty rates remain very high in Zambia, while urban poverty has fallen substantially in 
recent years. According to the 2006 LCMS the rural poverty rate was 77 percent, down 
moderately from 89 percent in 1998; however, during the same period urban poverty dropped 
by more than half, falling from 56 percent to just 27 percent. Rapidly declining urban poverty 
rates may lead donors to believe that similar results are possible in rural areas.  In practice, 
this is rarely the case.  Even in highly developed countries, reducing rural poverty is generally 
a result of migration by the poorest to urban areas; industrialized economies also employ well 
targeted (and expensive) transfer programs, the best of which often enjoy only limited 
success. Donors in Zambia, however, appear to expect that government policies, and external 
funding, could have a much more dramatic impact on rural poverty reduction than is actually 
feasible. 
 
The Zambian government, of course, is not without its share of responsibility for aid 
ineffectiveness. Zambian rural development policies, for example, frequently suffer from 
misplaced priorities. While investing in rural access and building feeder roads could have a 
positive impact in reducing rural poverty, most government (and donor) road funding 
concentrates on the major national road network. In other areas, such as the education and 
health sectors, implementation is inconsistent. The government’s emphasis on building 
schools and healthcare centers in rural areas is not matched by a commitment to quality 
service delivery; as a result, the bulk of resources are used in constructing facilities that 
function poorly, if at all, and access to education and health services remains limited. 
 
In terms of microeconomic policy, the government has not devoted sufficient 
resources to interventions that the productivity of the poor and their integration into the 
formal economy. Workers living near or below the poverty line typically lack the capital 
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necessary to invest in vocational training or other forms of education, even when the returns 
to education clearly justify the expense. Entrepreneurs in poor areas tend to operate in the 
informal sector; in many cases procedural burdens—such as costly and time-consuming 
requirements for obtaining a business license—discourage them from formalization, which in 
turn limits the scale of their enterprises and reduces aggregate tax revenue. In its approach to 
antipoverty programming, the Zambian government has consistently focused its resources on 
the social sectors, whereas economic interventions, such as the provision of more extensive 
and sophisticated agricultural extension services or efforts to bring informal businesses into 
the formal economy, could have a greater and more lasting impact. 
 
Because of pressure to demonstrate results, donors have to prove at least partial 
causality between aid (whether in the form of budget support or project financing) and a range 
of development outcomes; these usually include specific targets such as changes in poverty 
rates or indications that service delivery to the poor has improved. The need to establish a 
causal relationship between donor aid and antipoverty outcomes is a political necessity for the 
donors, but an inherently difficult and occasionally misleading exercise in practice. As a result 
of the analytical limitations involved, donors are forced to use proxies for poverty reduction. 
These proxies typically include the implementation of the budget, especially budget transfers 
to districts, and, more recently, measures related to the decentralization process or to the 
quality and sophistication of public financial management. These indicators are important for 
a variety of reasons, but they do not necessarily correspond to actual reductions in monetary 
or nonmonetary poverty; nevertheless, they are routinely used as such. 
 
In addition to domestic political and economic concerns (which are more influential 
for bilateral donors than for multilaterals), the budget processes in most donor countries create 
pressure for aid agencies to demonstrate quick results. This reinforces the tendency to use 
process-oriented reform proxies, such as those described above, which do not necessarily 
reflect the achievement of poverty-reduction objectives. There is a tendency among donors to 
assume that increased local spending results in greater poverty reduction; however, this link is 
not necessarily accurate and promoting the efficiency of local spending is in most cases both 
more important and harder to improve. For example, the Zambian government approved 
decentralization-related reforms late in 2009, in part due to continuous pressure by donors.  
The implementation of these reforms has been slow and inconsistent, but even a well-
implemented decentralization program would not necessarily guarantee rural poverty 
reduction—it is an instrumental goal, not a final outcome—but one that is aggressively 
promoted by donors’ aid agencies as a key to reducing rural poverty, even as we know that 
some pre-requisites need to be in place first to make it succesful. 
 
Similarly, most donors tend to concentrate on reforming the budget process in the 
interest of poverty reduction. But reducing poverty in Zambia, as in most poor countries, is 
the result of multiple factors and ultimately depends on the increased productivity of the poor, 
which is more difficult when poverty is concentrated in remote, sparsely populated, largely 
agricultural areas. This requires sustained improvements in education, as well as progress in 
very specific access to infrastructure and services (to better communications, feeder roads, 
agricultural extension services, finance, etc.). None of these improvements can be 
implemented quickly or easily, all are expensive, and none are the products of one-year 
budget cycles.  
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3. Donors’ inadequate quantitative rigor sometimes produces inappropriate 
strategies 
 
Donors have traditionally dominated the decision-making process that determines 
which policies are adopted, how aid is spent, and the conditions attached to its release. 
Although bilateral agencies, and especially multilateral institutions, have increasingly allowed 
recipient countries greater latitude in the determination of specific reform measures and 
promoted the collaborative determination of poverty-reduction strategies, recipient country 
governments have still been expected to adhere to the donors’ general priorities.  
 
Reducing poverty and income inequality are usually cited as the primary objectives of 
donor aid. As noted above, urban poverty in Zambia has declined in recent years, whereas 
rural poverty has remained relatively high. These trends are the result of an expansion in 
industrial and service-sector activities, which took place mostly in urban centers. These trends 
suggest that in the past decade the path out of poverty was through migration to urban areas 
where the number of jobs increased and productivity was higher than in the rural economy 
(Millennium Challenge Account 2010).  
 
This situation is not unique to Zambia: most donors and recipient governments in SSA 
have relied on the overarching assumption that most households in rural areas are not well-
connected to markets and therefore need access to a road passable by a cargo truck; as a 
result, massive investments are made to better connect remote areas with urban centers.28 Yet 
the empirical evidence increasingly contradicts the assumption that access will inevitably lead 
to growth and poverty reduction. The lack of robust evaluations and a comprehensive 
theoretical framework have lead to ineffective strategies, and this problem is now pervasive. 
The second Cameroonian national household survey (Enquête Camerounaise Auprès des 
Ménages II, 2001) and the Cameroon case study by Gachassin et al. (2010) demonstrate that 
investing in sealed roads is likely to have a much lower impact on poverty than is typically 
expected, while isolation from a sealed road is found to have no direct impact on consumption 
expenditures. The paper supports the conclusion that access to roads is at best only one factor 
contributing to poverty reduction, and not necessarily the most important.29  
 
Donors’ subsequent frustration with the lack of demonstrable progress usually only 
contributes to a more inefficient allocation of resources. In this case, donors have often 
responded to disappointing outcomes by increasing expenditures in low-density areas, both in 
infrastructure and the provision of services rather than by altering their strategies, which 
might signal that past efforts had been ineffective. These expanded investments produce 
infrastructure and facilities that are very expensive to maintain, typically continue to produce 
limited results in terms of poverty reduction, and may facilitate corruption via opaque and 
unaccountable contracting processes.30 
 
                                                           
28
 In this context, the Rural Access Index (RAI), which lists the proportion of rural people who live within 2 
kilometers of an all-season road, remains the main outcome indicator of road projects in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
has started to bias investments in favor of rural roads compared to the main and secondary networks. 
29
 Jayne et al. (2009) demonstrate that land area is one of the most important determinants of income levels. 
Differences between the lowest and highest quartile are high: the lowest quartile of smallholders has 0.62 
hectares to cultivate, whereas the first quartile has 4.98 hectares.  This is even more problematic since land 
allocation in Zambia still depends greatly on local chiefs and may not necessarily be transparent in some 
communities. 
30
 Croix and Delavallade (2009) demonstrate that in a low-income country with poor governance, public 
investment is typically skewed towards infrastructure.  
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Even more problematic are the findings of a comparative study (Jayne et al., 2009) 
assessing road unit costs and corruption “red flags” in SSA countries.  Despite the public 
perception that corruption controls were relatively strong, Zambia had one of the highest 
recurrent numbers of “red flags”31 in the project documents reviewed, comparable to those of 
Mozambique, Kenya and DRC and higher than Nigeria and the Republic of Congo (see 
Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Control-of-Corruption Index and the number of corruption “red flags” 
normalized by number of reviewed contracts per country 
 
 
Source: Alexeeva et al. (2008). The WBI Control of Corruption Index measures the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of 
the state by elites and private interests. 
 
In the health sector, donors continue to push for no community in Zambia to be less 
than 5 kilometers from a health facility. Therefore, health facilities continue to be built. 
However, in an interview in 2010 the chief of planning for the Zambian Ministry of Health 
acknowledged that even now almost half of the facilities are not fully staffed and do not have 
the necessary equipment and medicines.  
 
As Devarajan (2010) states, “development is a complex process and so development 
practitioners frequently resort to rules-of-thumb to guide decision making. To those of us who 
are constantly looking for simplifications or rules-of-thumb, and believe in the adage ‘what 
you measure gets done’—be careful what you wish for…rules-of-thumb give considerable 
room for political criteria to dominate investment decision making, and poor people 
frequently lose out”. That is exactly what donors’ lack of a comprehensive and quantitatively 
robust theoretical framework contributes to in education, health, roads and other sectors. 
 
Aid programs can also lead to ineffective reforms in public administration. In a short 
paper, Rajaram et al. (2010) state that during a discussion on public service management 
                                                           
31
 The main patterns are the following: 1. Difference between contract price and read-out bid price is >10 
percent, 2. Winning bid not the lowest bid accepted for detailed examination, 3. More than 7 month period from 
bid opening to contract signing, 4. Half or more firms buying bidding documents don’t bid. See Alexeeva et al. 
2008 for more details. 
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(PSM) reform in Zambia, a senior official explained: “in order to implement PSM, I had been 
asked to provide cars to reforms teams, we did it; then, we were asked to provide computers, 
we did that too; then, we were asked to provide them formal training overseas, we did that as 
well; they came back and what happened?... Nothing! There was no greater capacity to reform 
despite these investments. Why is it so? Because reforming the public sector requires a 
change in the behavior and mindsets of people; cars, computers and formal training do not 
help in most cases….  The day a project is initiated, our problems begin. Because of 
differentiated treatment of those in project units and the mention of vast sums of funds, civil 
servants outside the project unit do not wish to cooperate and consider the reform as alien to 
them and do not try to implement project tasks and certainly do not change behaviors”.   
 
One could argue that without providing financial aid, donors’ leverage over 
government efficiency would be low, and their ability to reduce corruption and promote good 
governance would be effectively restricted to whatever modest results might be achieved 
through diplomatic pressure. However, is spending $10-20 million for a governance-reform 
project the best way to convince civil servants to be more productive and change their 
behaviors? Once again, instrumental goals may be achieved, but final objectives remain 
elusive. Moreover the promise of providing significant financial resources to government 
agencies is often not merely ineffective, but appears to promote perverse incentives. In many 
countries a project becomes a way to extract and share rents rather than achieve improved 
public sector performance.  
 
In many cases there also seems to be a marked tendency on the part of recipient 
governments to amplify the “needs” of the country in order to attract more aid. In Zambia, the 
latest LCMS (2006) has yet to be officially published, apparently in part because the data 
shows a dramatic reduction in urban poverty and a more modest but still significant decline in 
rural poverty. Meanwhile, the minimum caloric intake used to define a key dimension of 
poverty in Zambia has been revised upwards. 
 
 
V. Conclusion and a possible way forward 
 
Zambia has many characteristics of an aid-dependent country and, inter alia, the fact 
that the GRZ does not collect its full potential of domestic revenues (especially mining taxes) 
may be due to the near-certainty that it will continue to receive substantial aid flowing with 
limited constraints.  
According to McPherson (2004.2), “After three decades of the misapplication of 
resources by the government and the donor community in Zambia, there is almost zero 
prospect that foreign aid can be made effective. […] For Zambia to grow and develop, foreign 
aid as we know it has to end”. He goes on to offer an “exit strategy” for the donor community. 
This proposal, however, appears to be excessive, especially given the lessons of successful 
projects implemented in recent years. But if aid is to continue, its efficacy and efficiency must 
be radically improved. 
 
There are at least six ways in which aid could be made more effective in achieving its 
objectives in Zambia and in other aid dependent countries: 
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1. Thoroughly evaluate the assumptions on which aid-related projects, and their 
objectives, are based; donors frequently design aid programs around unrealistic 
assumptions regarding the nature of the problem or the strategies that might be 
effective in addressing it. Pay particular attention to superficially reasonable but 
unsubstantiated conclusions (quality rural roads greatly increase rural incomes) and 
to spurious comparisons (urban poverty has decreased rapidly, therefore the same is 
possible for rural poverty). Successful projects are based on rigorous analytical work, 
not educated guesses. 
2. Alleviate pressure on aid agencies and their staff members to demonstrate immediate, 
tangible results, and focus instead on achievements sustained over time; unstaffed or 
ill-equipped facilities, unmaintained infrastructure, and swiftly reversed or unenforced 
policy reforms are all emblematic of wasteful and ineffective uses of aid, yet aid 
agencies’ frequent emphasis on producing demonstrable results in the short-term 
virtually ensures that they will continue to be commonplace. Aid agencies and their 
controlling policymakers must shift toward a more accurate concept of success, which 
is often not a matter of achieving objectives, but rather of sustaining those objectives 
over the long term. Donor assessments of aid projects should reflect the importance of 
enduring progress. 
3. Lower both the donor and the recipient government’s expectations regarding what aid 
can accomplish; aid is only capable of achieving a limited range of objectives, and in 
many cases worthwhile progress is necessarily modest and slow. Unrealistic 
projections lead to inefficient or even ineffective strategies; when aid programs are 
not achieving the desired results, donors should not simply double-down and invest 
more, but should candidly assess their approach and consider strategic changes.  
4. Develop a better understanding of the perverse effects of aid on the recipient 
government and take steps to limit them; both project-based aid and budget support 
instruments can undermine their own objectives if they do not account for the 
incentives of the public-sector agents and agencies responsible for implementing them. 
In the end, the professional goals of politicians and civil servants matter much more to 
the success of aid-financed programs than do the goals of donors or even the stated 
objectives of the recipient government as a whole. 
5. Increase aid recipient governments’ accountability for the success of donor projects; 
the tendency to rely on instrumental, process-oriented goals as proxies for final 
outcomes skews recipient incentives, encouraging the adoption of superficial or 
unenforced reforms and promoting investments in physical infrastructure that are not 
matched by adequate long-term funding. If more analytical work is necessary to 
evaluate final outcomes, donors should invest in it, as in most cases an accurate 
assessment of the ultimate success of a project is well worth the cost.  
6. Assess the relevance of strategies advocated by donors in the context of the recipient 
country; donor governments and their aid agencies often attempt to apply successful 
models from one country to another without sufficient attention to the different 
circumstances in which they are now operating. This may be compounded by aid 
professionals’ habit of moving from country to country and their tendency to rely on 
past experience to make current decisions. Both of these features of aid agencies are 
potential advantages, as breadth of experience should inform solid  program design; 
however, what was true in one country (or one region of the same country), or true at 
one time, may not be true to the present context. Again, rigorous analytical work is 
critical: two cases can only be considered comparable if the specific circumstances 
necessary for project success are similar.  
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A source of potential distortions and perverse incentives is related to the strict 
microeconomic effect of aid on the domestic job market. Although apparently limited in size, 
the aid industry demands a substantial amount of intellectual labor, which in many cases 
could be put to more productive use in government or the private sector. This situation, 
however, is greatly dependant on the gross human capital formation and employment 
conditions of the recipient country.  In Zambia and throughout much of SSA, education (and 
particularly higher education) systems are weak, emigration of skilled professionals is 
common, and domestic human capital is consequently very limited.  In this environment, the 
distortive effects of aid-agency employment on the recipient labor market are strong, 
especially in countries with a small total population in which aid-related employment 
represents a nontrivial share of the job market.  In this context, the human capital supplied by 
international professionals should be used in greater proportion than might be the case in 
countries, such as in Asia or Latin America, with larger populations and higher percentages of 
educated professionals. A further concern in hiring a large local aid staff, particularly for 
budget-support operations, is the potential creation of an influential domestic constituency 
with ties to the government and a clear incentive to maintain large aid volumes.  All of these 
factors should be taken into account when hiring aid professionals.32 
 
A related negative effect of aid is the development of rent-seeking behavior by 
economic agents, including both recipient-government officials and aid-agency professionals. 
The ready availability, and often effectively unconditional provision, of donor financing tends 
to perpetuate and increase aid flows regardless of their necessity and to the exclusion of 
domestically-mobilized resources. Rent-seeking behavior distorts the objectives of aid by 
generating self-perpetuating mechanisms in which the goal is to continue to attract funding 
rather than to achieve results. In fact, recipient governments may attempt to obscure evidence 
of development success and accentuate their perceived needs in order to obtain ever more 
external financing. This is especially problematic in the case of Zambia, where the 
government has delayed reports and redefined baselines in order to hide declining poverty 
rates, and where revenue collection from domestic sources, especially from politically 
influential mining companies, is very low.33  There is also a strong incentive for donor agents 
to collude in the effort to keep aid flowing, since—whether they are principally foreign or 
domestic hires—aid flows are the source of their employment and the volume of resources 
they manage often forms at least part of the basis for their professional advancement. 
 
There is a pressing need to substantially revise the overall incentive structure faced by 
donors. Donors are frequently under political pressure to justify their aid budgets; this 
pressure often manifests as overly ambitious objectives, such as dramatically reducing 
poverty or radically increasing economic growth rates, outcomes which are heavily dependent 
on a number of factors that cannot be influenced by any aid program. These objectives are 
then transformed into budget allocations that must be executed regardless of their potential for 
success.   
 
                                                           
32
 It should be noted that this is a complex and controversial subject, and this is not meant to be the final word on 
the matter.  Although a thorough explication of the arguments for and against the hiring of large numbers of 
local staff is beyond the scope of this paper, and such decisions should be made according to the specific context 
of individual countries, the summary presented above is accurate for most countries in SSA. 
33
  Lundstøl (2009) points out that, despite increased mining production in the last decade, domestic revenues as 
percentage of GDP decreased from 25-30 percent from independence to mid 1970s, above 20 percent mid 1970s 
to early 1990s and 16-18 percent 1990s and 2000s while the average for African low middle income countries is 
around 22 percent.%. Multiplying by a factor of 2 or 3 revenues collected from mining companies would lead to 
reach the SSA low-income average, which is equivalent to a large part of donor financing. 
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The World Bank is in many respects no different from other donors, as is evident in 
the case of many International Development Association (IDA) countries, including Zambia. 
IDA allocations are predetermined every three years according to a set of policy and 
institutional developments, and disbursement shares between budget support and projects are 
established according to the Country Assistance Strategy. If the allocation to the road sector, 
for instance, was deemed to be the most important priority, the fact that corruption in the road 
sector in Zambia has been recently discovered to be a major issue presents a problem for IDA: 
how to disburse funds to a sector riddled with corruption? (Note that the question is not 
whether to disburse funds to a sector riddled with corruption.) This is even more complicated 
if the Bank’s Board of Directors has already approved a credit and IDA now has to convince 
the government to make changes in the institutional structure of the road sector so as to be 
able to execute the disbursement according to the conditions of the credit, and not necessarily 
in a way that addresses the sector’s actual problems.   
 
The imperative to disburse funds leads donors to be overly concerned with 
instrumental goals and processes rather than the achievement of final objectives. Even if 
support to a specific project does not accomplish its intended goal, donors will often continue 
supporting the same project because it is part of a long-term budgetary decision. Worse, in 
some cases a lack of progress may itself be perceived (or simply used) as a reason to increase 
financial support for a given project, since failure can always be attributed to inadequate 
funding. This is one aspect of a pervasive and increasingly well-recognized problem: donor 
agents constantly face incentives to continue or increase funding, but never to reduce it. 
Gunning (2008) puts it bluntly: “careers are […] based on disbursing rather than withholding 
money”. Donors must react more quickly when circumstances change or when projects do not 
accomplish their intended objectives.  It is only after many years of supporting a project, and 
generally after a final evaluation has been done, that donors fully assess its impact. This 
remains the case despite the fact that support to such projects could have been beneficially 
modified or even ended years earlier and those funds used elsewhere had more proactive 
evaluations, and corresponding policy decisions, been made while they were still ongoing. 
 
Projects need to be evaluated by independent agencies outside of the donor country, its 
institutions and associated contractors. Internal evaluations create a clear conflict of interest 
that interferes with the frank evaluation of projects and the operation of continuous and 
effective feedback mechanisms. To this end the World Bank office in Zambia undertook a 
pilot program covering several projects in which it received independent evaluations provided 
by project beneficiaries; the office plans to expand this system to all Bank-financed projects 
in the country in order to get more accurate and objective feedback, collected by an 
independent source, on the actual impact of these projects. The frequent, rigorous and 
objective evaluation of development programs—and the identification of those that achieve 
their objectives, as well as those that fail--are of enormous importance for international 
organizations, governments, donors, and NGOs, yet they are frequently dispensed with in 
favor of internal assessments, often produced months or even years after the project has 
ended.34 
 
                                                           
34
 Several methods are traditionally used to measure the impact of development programs, e.g. propensity score 
matching, difference-in-difference estimates, and regression discontinuity design. Many econometric procedures 
and comparison groups used in program evaluations do not yield to accurate or precise estimates, and they often 
differ significantly from experimental results (LaLonde, 1986). Although the treatment effect for each person 
cannot always be identified through experiments, it is possible to vary one factor at a time and therefore provide 
internally valid estimates of the average treatment effect for a population of interest (Banerjee and Duflo, 2009) 
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In conclusion, it is clear that for Zambia and other aid-dependent countries the time 
has come to change how aid programs are designed, how aid is delivered, how the incentives 
of donor agents and recipient-government officials are arrayed, and how aid-financed projects 
are evaluated. For the variety of reasons described above aid continues to fail to produce its 
expected and necessary impact. The challenge of aid dependency is systemic, and involves 
donors and recipient countries alike. Perverse and conflicting incentives, a pervasive focus on 
instrumental goals over ultimate outcomes, inaccurate assumptions and distorted expectations, 
and administrative mechanisms that resist beneficial change all serve to undermine the 
fundamental purposes of aid. Addressing these challenges will not be easy, but as the saying 
goes, nothing worthwhile ever is.   
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Annex 1: Aid distribution by sector 
 
The aid distribution from bilateral and multilateral donors shows that over the analyzed period 
(1995-2009) the flows were mainly directed to social sectors, especially health sector; to the 
action related to debt relief; and it was also distributed as program assistance in the form of 
general budget support. The distribution seems to have been poverty oriented. Hence it does 
not look to have contributed to poverty reduction given that today almost two third of 
population live on or below the poverty line. 
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ODA distribution by sector, 1995-2009, (%) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Social infrastructure 36 46 25 24 24 36 48 41 39 25 28 35 46 53 42 
Education 2 4 3 10 13 2 10 10 14 7 7 4 7 7 4 
Health 10 6 1 3 5 4 19 13 5 3 5 14 10 7 4 
Pop. Pol./Progr &Reproductive 
Health 
3 1 2 2 1 3 5 9 15 5 8 7 17 27 24 
Water Supply & Sanitation 7 1 15 8 1 8 6 2 2 2 3 3 5 4 2 
Government & Civil Society 9 12 2 1 3 14 4 4 2 4 5 6 5 4 6 
Other Social Infrastructure & 
Services 
5 23 2 1 1 4 5 3 1 3 0 1 2 3 1 
Economic infrastructure 5 22 21 30 13 8 12 8 3 15 1 5 14 10 17 
Transport & Storage 4 19 19 7 10 4 6 7 0 12 0 4 13 7 9 
Communications 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Energy 0 0 1 20 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 5 
Banking & Financial Services 0 1 0 0 0 3 5 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 
Business & Other Services 0 2 1 2 1 1 1 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Production sectors 14 11 21 4 5 20 4 7 11 7 7 10 3 2 7 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 13 8 5 3 5 3 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 2 6 
Industry, Mining, Construction 1 2 16 0 0 17 2 3 9 2 4 7 0 0 1 
Trade Policies & Regulations 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Tourism 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Multi-sector/Cross-cutting 3 1 6 3 4 1 2 4 5 3 2 2 3 3 2 
Commodity aid / General Prog. 25 3 1 15 29 14 24 25 15 21 11 8 27 31 30 
 General Budget Support 22 0 0 13 29 14 23 22 14 20 10 8 26 30 28 
Dev. Food Aid/Food Security 
Assistance 
3 3 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Other Commodity Assistance 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Action Relating to Debt 16 16 25 23 23 21 9 11 25 30 50 38 6 0 1 
Humanitarian Aid 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Annex 2: The outcomes of selected aid-financed programs in the last decade  
 
The Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Programme (BESSIP) 
 
The Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Programme (BESSIP) is a SAPp covering 
the primary education sector. It was implemented by the GRZ through its Ministry of 
Education, starting in 1999. and was organized to achieve the following objectives: (1) 
increasing the gross enrollment ratio (GER); (2) reducing the gap between the gross and net 
enrollment rates (NER); and (3) improving the quality of primary education; a fourth 
objective was added in a revised version of the program (BESSIP1) specifying the 
construction of two secondary schools in the Eastern Province. 
The first BESSIP objective was achieved: in fact the target, which was to increase the 
GER to 100 percent in grades 1-7 by 2005, was exceeded. The elimination of school fees was 
clearly also a strong factor. According to the 2004 World Bank Country Assistance Strategy 
(CAS) enrollment grew by 2 percent during the three years of BESSIP1 (1999-2001), below 
the population growth rate and well below the7 percent rate observed after the free education 
initiative was announced. Progress in other areas was also substantial: the completion rate 
increased from 66 to 82 percent from 1998 to 2005; the dropout rate decreased on average 
from 5 to 2.8 percent; and the grade-repetition rate fell from 7 to 6.6 percent. 
However, improvements under the third objective were negligible. Learning 
achievement, based on standardized test scores, was measured in grade 5 in 1999 and 2003. 
The results indicate a slight increase in English scores from 33 to 34 percent, and in 
Mathematics from 34 to 38 percent. Measuring achievement in 2005, as originally planned, 
would have provided more time for achievement to improve as results in this area are not 
instant. Holding achievement rates constant during a period of rapid enrollment expansion 
could be considered an accomplishment, but the expansion would not have reached grade 5 by 
2003. More relevant is the fact that the availability of books was below planned levels (1 book 
for 3-4 children compared to the planned 1 book for 2); school health programs were not 
widely implemented; curriculum revisions were not completed; and hours of instruction 
(already low by African standards according to the 2004 CAS) were falling even further due 
to more double- and triple-shifting.  
The achievement of the fourth objective was also far from satisfactory. The 
construction of the two schools was delayed and overly expensive (costs exceeded the budget 
and they were above the norm for this type of school). Moreover, when the schools were 
finally completed water and electricity were not yet available.  
Problems with book distribution were never fully resolved, nor was there a clear plan 
for decentralized book procurement. Finally, although the hiring of teachers has begun again, 
it will take time and perseverance before there are enough trained teachers to provide quality 
instruction in the poorest communities.  
 
The Zambia Social Recovery Program (SRP) 
 
Another example of uneven results between instrumental and final objectives is the 
Zambia Social Recovery Program (SRP), which was initiated in 1991 and administered by the 
Ministry of Finance. The SRP is not a SWAp, and funding was directed to several sectors: (i) 
education - to rehabilitate school buildings and provide furniture and basic equipment; (ii) 
health - to rehabilitate or construct health posts and medical centers and to provide basic 
equipment, furniture and an initial complement of medical supplies; and (iii) other sectors - to 
finance basic economic infrastructure such as rural roads, bridges and marketplaces, water 
and sanitation systems, and irrigation projects. 
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Several positive impacts were observed in these sectors. In the education sector the 
funds enhanced school attendance: 78 percent of children in treatment communities attended 
school compared to 71 percent in pipeline communities. In the health sector the funds have: 
(1) increased the probability of a household to report that someone had been sick in the past 
two weeks from the 41 percent in both the pipeline and PSM (Propensity Score Matching) 
communities to 49 percent in communities where funds supported a health project; this result 
may be partially explained by the fact that social-fund health interventions have reached areas 
with higher rates of sickness; (2) decreased the probability to report a case of diarrhea from 14 
percent of households that reported sickness in the PSM and pipeline groups to 8.6 percent in 
the treatment group; (3) decreased the probability of not seeking treatment in communities 
that reported sickness from 49 percent in the two control groups to 38 percent in social -fund 
communities. However, when considering the incidence of diarrhea or likelihood of seeking 
treatment among all households, not conditioned on reporting illness, no significant difference 
between the treatment and control groups is found, which suggests that the funds had no 
effect on the actual level of sickness in communities, though it did increase community 
awareness of health issues. 
 
The Economic Management and Growth Credit II (EMGC II) 
 
The Economic Management and Growth Credit II (EMGC II) aimed at providing 
support to the government in order to: (1) pursue reforms in Zambia's macroeconomic 
framework in a manner conducive to robust growth; (2) strengthen the credibility and 
institutional capacity of the public sector; (3) enhance Zambia's growth opportunities while 
improving its poverty impact.  
Achievements under the first objective were substantial. The operation was especially 
concerned with reducing arrears to the public service pension fund (PSPF) and to establish the 
Credit Reference Bureau Africa Limited (CRBAL) to improve private-sector access to 
financing. Since the EMCG II was initiated there has been a significant reduction in arrears to 
the pension fund, which declined from ZMK 388 billion at the end of 2006 to ZMK 93 billion 
at the end of 2008. The CRBAL was successfully established and appears to have been 
responsible for a remarkable improvement in the "Getting Credit" indicator in the Doing 
Business Report 2010, with Zambia moving from a rank of 68 to 30 between June 2008 and 
May 2009.   
Progress in the area targeted by the second objective, public-sector credibility and 
institutional capacity, was also substantial. The 2008 Public Expenditure and Financial 
Accountability Assessment (PEFA) report indicates that an automated Payroll Management 
System is now in place. Budget execution improved, as did policy consistency and the 
sustained financing of priority programs. The credibility of the budget has also increased, with 
execution determined to be "to a large extent" in accordance with the estimates approved by 
the Zambian Parliament. Domestic arrears were reduced substantially in fiscal year 2008. The 
overall PEFA rating increased from 2.2 to 2.7 between 2005 and 2008.  
However, progress on the third objective was only modest and variable. In order to 
promote a private sector-led economic development strategy, the Zambia Development 
Agency (ZDA) was created. One of its major accomplishments was to reduce the number of 
days required to start a business from 35 days in 2005 to 10 days in 2007. With regard to the 
agricultural sector an initiative supported by the EMGC II was to provide help to the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives for the drafting and finalization of the Agricultural 
Marketing Act. However, this act was not submitted to Parliament in 2008 as anticipated (nor 
had it been submitted by April 2010), and the delay in implementing these reforms continues 
to constrain development in the agricultural sector, which would have the potential to 
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significantly improve growth, employment, and poverty reduction. Concerning infrastructure, 
the increase in staffing for the road agencies was completed, and a system for maintaining the 
national core road network now exists. However, a survey showed a significant deterioration 
in the condition of unpaved core roads.  
 
The Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) 
 
The recently completed evaluation of the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) 
2007-2010, described above, provides very interesting insights into aid effectiveness in the 
country. According to the first evaluation (Oxford Policy Management 2010), this initiative 
has led to a more structured process for managing support to the GRZ, but “it is too early to 
say if this will have a beneficial developmental outcome”. Although the JASZ addresses all 
five commitments under the Paris Declaration, most of the actions completed to date involve 
donor harmonization and the alignment of lending goals. The effects of this process have been 
positive, and have produced:  
 Greater coordination among CPs and efforts to develop more coordinated dialogue 
with GRZ, which decreased the variety of bilateral demands on the Ministries’ top 
management. 
 Improved information sharing amongst CPs in general, and at the sector level in 
particular; this appears to have reduced overlap between projects, and at sector level 
information has been shared about successful approaches adopted by other CPs in the 
same sector.  
 The implementation of the Division of Labor Matrix has resulted in decongestion in 
some sectors; for certain CPs it has encouraged greater focus in their country 
programs.  
 The processes developed in Zambia have been genuinely inclusive of those CPs that 
are unable or reluctant to give Poverty Related Budget Support (PRBS).  
However, according to the evaluators, there is little evidence that the JASZ has 
promoted greater country ownership at the national level and, even more importantly, “less 
obvious progress [has been made] with regard to aid effectiveness and development 
outcomes”. It could therefore be inferred that the JASZ has become more an end in itself than 
an instrumental process designed to achieve larger development objectives. Moreover, the 
report highlighted that there has not been an obvious reduction of the total number of projects 
in the health or education sectors, despite better coordination between the government 
leadership and CPs.  
The report also raised questions over the nature of the role of the GRZ in the absence 
of a comprehensive Aid Policy and Strategy, especially given the weakness of GRZ’s aid-
related budgetary systems and processes for aid management, its apparent inability to adopt 
an effective cross-sector strategic view on aid issues (Oxford Policy Management 2010).  
In each of these cases the same pattern emerges: the initiative’s instrumental goals are 
achieved, but these are insufficient to fully realize the final goals of the operation. School 
attendance increases, but educational attainment does not measurably improve; people in rural 
areas become more likely to report an illness, but incidence of illness remains the same; new 
public agencies are established, but progress in the areas for which they were created is highly 
uneven; new forums and joint-strategies are developed by donors, but substantive cooperation 
remains very limited. This is not to say that these efforts have not produced results, but those 
results tend to be modest, variable, and clustered around the attainment of specific, process-
oriented changes rather than the addressing the broader development outcomes that are the 
ultimate goal of the operations. 
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